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Realist arguments are often reinforced by relativist arguments that moral values are historically or culturally specific rather than universal. For example, Kennan argued that "there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles."  Many nonrealists share such relativist skepticism.

It is often claimed that there are a variety of distinctive and defensible conceptions of human rights that merit our respect and toleration even if we disagree with them. One standard form of this argument, which was particularly prominent in the 1980s, was the claim that there are "three worlds" of human rights. The "Western" (First World) approach, it is asserted, emphasizes civil and political rights and the right to private property. The "socialist" ( Second World) approach emphasizes economic and social rights. The "Third World" approach emphasizes self-determination and economic development. Furthermore, both the socialist and the Third World conceptions are held to be group oriented, in contrast to the fundamental individualism of the "Western" approach.

The reality of Western practice over the past half century, however, has been quite different. The West may have neglected economic and social rights in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  But that anyone looking at the welfare states of Western Europe over the past half century can be expected to take such a description of the Western approach seriously, to put it bluntly, boggles the mind. In fact, the liberal democratic welfare states of Western (and especially northern) Europe are the countries that have taken most seriously the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. And it is in these countries that we find the most complete realization of internationally recognized economic, social, and cultural rights.

Conversely, as we saw in 1989, citizens in the former Soviet bloc, when given the opportunity, demanded their civil and political rights. Far from being a superfluous bourgeois luxury, Eastern Europeans no less than Western Europeans see civil and political rights as essential to a life of dignity. And the dismal state of Soviet bloc economies suggests that the sacrifice of civil and political rights probably did not even facilitate the long-term realization of economic and social rights.

found that internationally recognized civil and political rights are essential to protecting themselves against repressive economic and political elites. When given the chance, they have in effect declared that sacrifices made in the name of development, self-determination, or national security were not chosen but were imposed through force and the systematic violation of civil and political rights.

Political histories, cultural legacies, economic conditions, and human rights problems certainly differ in these three "worlds." For that matter, there is considerable diversity even within each "world," especially the Third World. Cultural relativity is a fact. Social institutions and values have varied, and continue to vary, with time and place. Nonetheless, I will argue that contemporary international human rights norms have near universal applicability, requiring only relatively modest adjustments in the name of cultural diversity.

Moral relativism, the belief that moral values (and thus conceptions of human rights) are determined by history, culture, economics, or some other independent social force, is best seen as a matter of degree. At one extreme is a radical relativism that sees culture (or history, or economics) as the source of all values.  Such a position in effect denies the very idea of human rights, for it holds that there are no rights that everyone is entitled to equally, simply as a human being. Radical relativism can be ignored once we have decided, as we have above, that there are human rights, rights that all human beings have, independent of society (and thus irrespective of their particular history or culture).

At the other end of the spectrum lies radical universalism, the view that all values, including human rights, are entirely universal, in no way subject to modification in light of cultural or historical differences. In its pure form, radical universalism would hold that there is only one set of human rights that applies at all times and in all places. But to insist that all human rights be implemented in identical ways in all countries would be wildly unrealistic, and most people would find such a demand morally and politically perverse.

Rejecting the two end points of the spectrum leaves us with a considerable variety of "relativist" positions, which can be roughly divided into two ranges. Strong relativism holds that human rights (and other values) are principally, but not entirely, determined by culture or other circumstances. "Universal" human rights serve as a check on culturally specific values. The emphasis, however, is on variation and relativity. Weak relativism reverses the emphasis. Universal human rights are held to be subject only to secondary cultural modifications. I will defend a form of weak cultural relativism on both descriptive and prescriptive grounds.

For example, it is difficult to imagine defensible arguments in the contemporary world to deny rights to life, liberty, security of the person, or protection against slavery, arbitrary arrest, racial discrimination, and torture. The rights to food, health care, work, and social insurance are equally basic to any plausible conception of equal human dignity.

Universality, however, is only an initial presumption. Deviations from international human rights norms may be justified, even demanded. For example, the free and full consent of spouses in marriage (Universal Declaration, Article 16) reflects a culturally specific conception of marriage that it would be unreasonable to apply everywhere without exception. This does not mean that we should approve of forced marriages. It does, however, suggest that we tolerate some notions of consent that would be unacceptable in the contemporary West.

The possibility of justifiable modifications, however, must not obscure the fundamental universality of international human rights norms. Deviations should be rare. And the need to keep their cumulative impact minor suggests that substantial variations are likely to be legitimate only in relatively specific and detailed matters of implementation.

We can distinguish three levels at which the substance of a human right can be specified. At the top are what we can call "concepts," very general formulations such as the rights to political participation or work. Little cultural variability at this level is justifiable. Below these are what we can call "interpretations." For example, a guaranteed job and unemployment insurance are two interpretations of the right to work. Some interpretative variability seems plausible for most internationally recognized human rights. And at a still more detailed third level, there is room for considerable variation in the particular form in which an interpretation is implemented.

Suppose that we interpret the right to political participation as a right to vote in open and fair elections. Members of the legislature might be chosen through winner-take-all elections in local districts or by a system in which people vote for party lists and seats in the legislature are awarded proportional to the national vote. Such variations of form should usually be considered permissible, as long as they tend to realize a defensible interpretation of the governing concept.

The weak relativist position sketched above would reject such an argument. The claim that because of ascriptive characteristics such as age, sex, race, or family one is not entitled to the same basic human rights as members of other groups is incompatible with the very idea of human rights. This does not imply that all differences based on gender are incompatible with human rights. For example, dress codes to protect public morals and decency, such as the Muslim requirement that women wear veils in public or the Western requirement that women (but not men) cover their chests in public, clearly lie within the realm of permissible distinctions. But the claim that one group in society has radically different basic rights from another group -- for example, that it can deny the rights to vote, speak, and assemble freely to women, deny women full and equal legal personality, or award otherwise identical men and women different treatment in social insurance schemes -- is not a culturally different conception of human rights but a (partial) rejection of the very idea of human rights.

Human rights do not require cultural homogenization. If women choose to vote as their husbands do or choose a private family life instead of a public life and work outside of the home, human rights require that such choices be respected. But when they are imposed -- and especially when those who define and enforce differential rights receive preferred treatment -- they involve unacceptable violations of human rights.

Such an argument does not imply wanton cultural imperialism. The legacy of imperialism demands that Westerners in particular show special caution and sensitivity when dealing with clashing cultural values. Caution, however, must not be confused with inaction. Even if we are not entitled to impose our values on others, they are our own values. Sometimes they may demand that we act on them even in the absence of agreement by others. And if the practices of others are particularly objectionableconsider, for example, societies in which it is traditional to kill the firstborn child if it is female or the deeply rooted tradition of anti-Semitism in the West -- even strongly sanctioned traditions may deserve neither our respect nor our toleration.